The Expanding Definition of “Promoter”: Impact on Landowners’ Rights. Need for parliamentary intervention?

NEED FOR AUTHORITATIVE CLARIFICATION BY THE BOMBAY HIGH COURT ON THE SCOPE OF SECTION 11 OF MOFA: GERALD MICHAEL MISQUITTA AND ROHINI GUPTA

  Gerald Michael Misquitta Vs State of Maharashtra ( “Gerald” )

Rohini Gupta & Anr. v. District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies & Ors., WP No. 5991/2026, Bombay High Court, decided 8 September 2026, in which Mohini Gupta is the second petitioner. Indian Kanoon ( “Gupta” )

The two cases are quite closely connected because both concern Section 11 of MOFA, deemed conveyance, landowners/lessees, and the powers of the District Deputy Registrar (DDR). But there is an important difference: Gerald Misquitta is primarily a procedural/natural-justice case, whereas Gupta is substantially a Section 2(c)/Section 11 substantive-promoter case.

1. Basic facts — side-by-side

Sr No	Particulars	Gerald Michael Misquitta v. State of Maharashtra	Rohini Gupta & Anr. v. DDR3
1	Court	Bombay High Court	Bombay High Court
2	Judgment date	25 Feb 2026	8 Sept 2026
3	Petition	WP 1739/2022	WP 5991/2026
4	Ownership	Misquitta family property, Vile Parle West	Gupta family property, Juhu
5	Original owners	Multiple Misquitta co-owners	Late Kundanlal Laxmichand Gupta; petitioners were his heirs
6	Developer/lessee structure	Owners → Rahejas → A.K. Associates/sub-lessee	Owner → Raheja/Wadhwa lessees → developers
7	Society Name	Priya Co-operative Housing Society	Queens Park Premises Co-operative Society
8	Lease	98-year lease	98-year lease
9	Earlier transfer to society	Society claimed/received only leasehold-related rights	Society already received assignment of leasehold rights in 1978
10	DDR order	28 May 2014	23 June 2025
11	Main challenge	Owners were not properly impleaded/heard; DDR did not conduct required enquiry	Whether landowners themselves became “promoters” under MOFA

 

Result

DDR order + conveyance quashed and remanded

Petition dismissed; DDR order upheld

The Misquitta judgment records that the property was owned by several co-owners and that the society’s deemed-conveyance application proceeded without impleading all of them. Indian Kanoon The Gupta judgment records a 98-year lease from Kundanlal Gupta and subsequent construction of Queens Park by the lessees/developers. Indian Kanoon

2. Paragraph-wise comparison

This is the more useful way to read the judgments.

1. Para 1–3 — What is being challenged?

Gerald — paras 1–3

The petitioner challenged the DDR’s 28 May 2014 certificate permitting unilateral deemed conveyance and the subsequent registered deed of assignment/transfer dated 5 July 2014.

The important factual feature was that the petitioner claimed to be a co-owner, but was not properly made a party to the deemed-conveyance proceedings. Indian Kanoon

Gupta — paras 1–4

The petitioners were the legal heirs of the original landowner. They challenged the DDR’s order dated 23 June 2025 granting unilateral deemed conveyance of approximately 3,901.70 sq.m. to Queens Park Society.

The Gupta petitioners said that their father had died in 1981 and that the DDR had proceeded on a notice issued in his name. Indian Kanoon

Difference

In Gerald, the central problem was:

“Were all persons whose rights were affected actually heard?”

In Gupta, the central question became:

“Were these landowners themselves promoters under Section 2(c) MOFA?”

 

3. Paragraphs 10–15 — Meaning of “promoter”

This is the most important substantive difference.

Gerald

The Court did not finally determine the title/promoter controversy because it found that the DDR’s procedure itself was defective.

The Court emphasised that the Competent Authority’s enquiry under Section 11 is summary and is principally concerned with whether:

1. there is a Section 4 MOFA agreement;
2. the promoter failed to convey his right/title/interest; and
3. the statutory obligation under MOFA was not performed.

But summary procedure does not mean no natural justice. Indian Kanoon

Gupta — paras 13–16

Justice Sandeep V. Marne went much further into Section 2(c).

The Court explained that “promoter” includes a person who:

• constructs the building; or
• causes the building to be constructed.

The Court then made an important factual test:

merely owning land and engaging a developer does not automatically make the landowner a promoter;

but

if the landowner actively participates in construction, determines how construction is undertaken, or participates in sale/construction, the landowner may wear “two hats” — landowner + promoter. Indian Kanoon

Key distinction

Gerald: Court avoided finally deciding whether the landowners were promoters.

Gupta: Court expressly examined the issue and concluded that, on its facts, both the lessors and lessees could be promoters, because construction was jointly caused by them. Indian Kanoon

4. Leasehold rights vs ownership rights

This is another major point.

Gerald — paras 20–21

The society’s own application was essentially seeking leasehold rights/building conveyance, while the DDR’s order directed transfer of the promoter’s right, title and interest.

The Court noticed that the society and DDR appeared satisfied with conveyance limited to leasehold rights, but the original owners continued to claim ownership/reversionary rights.

However, the Court did not finally adjudicate those substantive ownership rights. It said those issues were not necessary to decide the present writ because the proceeding was fundamentally defective procedurally. Indian Kanoon

Gupta — paras 32–35

The Court directly addressed this issue.

The developers had agreed to assign leasehold rights under one clause, but another clause contemplated perfecting ownership title for transfer to the society.

The Court therefore read the contractual provisions together with Section 11 MOFA and held that the society could ultimately receive the promoter’s entire right, title and interest, where the relevant person was a promoter-owner. Indian Kanoon

The Court relied substantially on Haresh Vijaysinh Bhatia.

Practical difference

Gerald:

“The DDR cannot convey rights affecting owners without first hearing them.”

Gupta:

“Where the landowner is also a promoter, Section 11 can operate against that landowner’s ownership rights.”

That is a very important distinction.

5. Already-assigned leasehold rights

This is probably the closest factual point between the two cases.

Gerald

The property had a chain of:

Original owners → Rahejas → A.K. Associates → society/development arrangement.

The DDR had accepted the sub-lease position without adequately verifying the underlying documents. The Court specifically criticised the DDR for proceeding without obtaining the relevant sub-lease document.

 

Gupta

Here, there was an actual Indenture of Assignment dated 17 March 1978, by which the developers/lessees had assigned leasehold rights to the society.

The landowners argued:

“If the society already got the promoter’s leasehold rights, there was no remaining failure under Section 11, so the DDR had no jurisdiction.”

The Court rejected that argument.

Why?

Because it found multiple promoters. The assignment could constitute only partial performance by one promoter. The landowner-promoters’ obligations remained outstanding. Therefore, there was still a “failure” for purposes of Section 11(3).

This is one of the strongest substantive points in Gupta.

6. Natural justice — the biggest apparent contrast

 Gerald — paras 21–30

The Court was emphatic.

The DDR had:

• failed to join all co-owners;
• failed to give them an effective hearing;
• failed to properly verify relevant documents;
• failed to conduct the enquiry contemplated by Section 11(4).

The Court therefore held there was a gross violation of audi alteram partem.

It also rejected the argument that there was no prejudice.

The judgment discusses Sudhir Kumar Singh and the later Krishnadatt Awasthy decision, explaining the constitutional importance of procedural fairness.

Result:

DDR order quashed + conveyance cancelled + matter remanded.

Gupta — para 37

Here the result is almost the opposite.

The Gupta petitioners argued natural justice because the original notice was addressed to their deceased father.

But the Court found that:

• the petitioners received the notice;
• they communicated with the Competent Authority;
• they knew about the proceedings;
• they nevertheless did not appear and contest the application.

Therefore, the Court held that they could not subsequently complain of violation of natural justice.

Very important distinction

The two cases are not necessarily contradictory on natural justice.

The factual difference is:

Gerald

Co-owners were not made parties and were not effectively heard.

Gupta

Legal heirs had received notice and communicated with the authority but chose not to participate.

So the courts treated the procedural facts differently.

7. Section 11(4) enquiry

Gerald

This was a decisive issue.

Section 11(4) requires the Competent Authority to:

• verify documents;
• make necessary enquiries;
• give reasonable opportunity of hearing.

The Court found that the DDR had not properly performed these functions.

Gupta

The Court accepted that Section 11(4) jurisdiction existed and that the DDR could proceed.

Because the landowners themselves were found to fall within the promoter category, and because their obligation to convey their rights remained outstanding, the DDR had jurisdiction under Section 11(3)/(4).

8. Prejudice principle

This is another useful paragraph-wise comparison.

 

Sr No.	Issue	Gerald	Gupta
1	Natural justice	Violated	No actionable violation on facts
2	Prejudice	Court found serious prejudice	Court found petitioners had notice/opportunity
3	Reason	Actual co-owners excluded from proceedings	Heirs knew of proceedings but did not participate
4	Effect	DDR order invalidated	DDR order maintained

 

In Gerald, the Court specifically found that the exclusion of the co-owners could affect their property rights and therefore was not an inconsequential procedural defect.

In Gupta, the Court said the petitioners had received notice and had themselves chosen not to appear.

9. Final orders

Gerald — para 31

The Court:

1. quashed the DDR order dated 28 May 2014;
2. cancelled the unilateral deed of conveyance dated 5 July 2014;
3. remanded the application to the DDR;
4. directed a fresh hearing;
5. kept all parties’ contentions open.

Importantly, the Court expressly said its consideration was confined to the legality/correctness of the impugned order, and the DDR should decide the application afresh without being influenced by the observations.

Yes. I have now checked the actual text of both judgments, particularly Gerald paras 15–30 and Gupta paras 25–40. There is a much sharper distinction than my earlier answer suggested.

The key is that Gupta para 38 is not the reason the writ petition was dismissed. Para 38 preserves the petitioners’ civil remedy. Para 39 then gives a separate reason why the High Court nevertheless declines to interfere. Indian Kanoon

1. The two judgments side-by-side — paras 25–40

Sr No	Issue	Gerald Michael Misquitta	Rohini Gupta
1	Central issue	Whether owners had to be heard before deemed conveyance	Whether original landowners became promoters under s.2(c)
2	Natural justice	Core issue	Raised, but rejected
3	Notice	Petitioner/co-owners not made parties	Petitioners received notice addressed to deceased father and actually wrote to DDR ( But were not inserted in the proceedings)
4	Participation	No effective opportunity	Court says they should have appeared and opposed
5	Section 11(4) enquiry	Not properly conducted	Court accepted DDR’s jurisdiction
6	Landowner as promoter	Not finally decided	Yes, expressly decided
7	Existing lease/assignment	DDR had not verified sub-lease	Assignment of lease only partly discharged promoters’ obligation
8	Title issue	Not adjudicated	Not finally adjudicated; civil suit preserved
9	Writ result	DDR order quashed and remanded	DDR order upheld; writ dismissed

2. Gerald para 15 vs Gupta paras 24–26

Gerald para 15

Gerald starts from a very important proposition:

The Competent Authority’s inquiry is summary, but it still has to determine:

• whether there is a Section 4 agreement;
• whether the promoter failed to convey his rights;
• whether the statutory obligation under Section 11 was breached.

The Authority is not supposed to decide complicated questions of title. Indian Kanoon

Then comes Gerald para 16:

the petitioner’s challenge was not a title challenge; ownership was undisputed.

The challenge was specifically to whether the Competent Authority followed natural justice.

That distinction is crucial.

Gupta paras 24–26

Gupta takes a different route.

It first determines:

Are the Gupta landowners themselves “promoters”?

The Court answers yes, because of their participation in the construction arrangement and the contractual terms of the lease.

It then says that once they are promoters, Section 11(1) obligations attach to them. Indian Kanoon

Therefore:

Gerald:

“Before deciding the deemed-conveyance application, the District Deputy Registrar-3 ( DDR 3 ) must follow fair procedure.”

Gupta:

“These landowners themselves fall within the statutory category of promoter, so Section 11 obligations apply to them.”

These are different questions.

3. Gerald paras 18–23 vs Gupta para 37

This is where the judgments appear to conflict at first sight.

Gerald

Gerald found that the Society deliberately joined only six legal heirs, despite the property having other co-owners.

Even more importantly:

• one of the six was already dead;
• the petitioner was not joined;
• other co-owners were not joined;
• the Society had previously been told that original owners needed to be made parties;
• the DDR nevertheless proceeded. Indian Kanoon

The Court therefore said the owners were entitled to be made parties and heard.

Para 22 concludes that the petitioner and other co-owners were neither made parties nor given an opportunity of hearing. Indian Kanoon

Then para 23 is extremely strong:

the summary nature of Section 11 proceedings does not permit the DDR to overlook natural justice.

The Court calls it a complete breach of audi alteram partem. Indian Kanoon

Gupta para 37

The factual position was materially different.

The Gupta Court records:

1. notice was received in the name of their father;
2. the petitioners informed the Competent Authority that their father had died;
3. they therefore knew about the proceedings;
4. they nevertheless did not appear and contest them.

The Court therefore held:

They cannot subsequently complain of violation of natural justice. Indian Kanoon

This is the most important factual distinction.

It is not:

Gerald says owners must always win on natural justice; Gupta says owners don’t need a hearing.

It is:

Gerald

affected co-owners were not made parties / not given an effective opportunity.

Gupta

affected heirs knew about the proceedings, communicated with the authority, but did not participate.

That is why the two judgments can be reconciled on this point.

4. But there is a much more interesting issue: Gerald para 24–25

This is where I think Gerald is potentially more important than Gupta if you are challenging a DDR order.

Gerald discusses the “prejudice” argument.

The Society argued essentially:

Even if there was some procedural defect, what prejudice was actually caused?

Gerald rejected that approach in the circumstances.

The Court relied on the Constitution Bench/larger-bench discussion in Krishnadatt Awasthy and emphasised that procedural fairness has an intrinsic value.

In particular, Gerald records the principle that courts should not assess procedural fairness solely by asking whether the outcome would have been different. Indian Kanoon

That is significant.

Gupta para 37 does not really engage with that deeper proposition.

Gupta simply says, on its facts:

You received notice, you wrote to the DDR, you should have appeared, and therefore you cannot complain now.

So the two judgments are different in their factual application of natural justice, rather than necessarily laying down contradictory legal principles.

5. Gerald paras 26–30 — the DDR’s enquiry itself was defective

This is another area where Gerald is particularly strong.

The Court found that the DDR:

• knew from the lease deed that the property had original owners;
• nevertheless failed to bring all owners before him;
• accepted the alleged sub-lease merely on assertions;
• did not obtain the actual sub-lease document;
• failed to verify the authenticity of relevant documents;
• failed to conduct the enquiry required by Section 11(4). Indian Kanoon

So Gerald is not merely:

“No notice = order bad.”

It is broader:

No proper parties + no effective hearing + inadequate document verification + inadequate Section 11(4) enquiry = defective exercise of statutory jurisdiction.

That combination led to the quashing.

6. Now compare this with Gupta paras 34–36

This is where Gupta goes in a completely different direction.

The Gupta Court accepts:

Developer/lessees = promoters

and

landowner/lessor = also promoter.

Therefore, the 1978 assignment of leasehold rights by the developer did not finish the Section 11 obligation.

The Court reasons:

there can be multiple promoters.

So:

Promoter A — developer/lessee
→ assigned leasehold rights to Society in 1978.

But:

Promoter B — landowner/lessor
→ had not conveyed his own right, title and interest.

Therefore there remained a “failure” under Section 11(3) as against Promoter B. Indian Kanoon

That is the foundation for the DDR’s jurisdiction in Gupta.

7. This is the major substantive difference

Consider these two factual situations:

Gerald

Original owner
↓
98-year lease
↓
Rahejas
↓
alleged sub-lease
↓
A.K. Associates/developer
↓
Society

But the DDR did not properly verify the sub-lease and did not bring all owners before him.

So the Court says:

Stop. Rehear the matter properly. Indian Kanoon

Gupta

Original owner
↓
98-year lease
↓
developers/lessees
↓
construction
↓
Society

But the lease itself contained extensive rights/obligations concerning:

• construction;
• supervision;
• insurance;
• ownership of building on expiry/determination.

The Court therefore concludes that the lessor was not merely a passive landowner.

He had promoter characteristics under Section 2(c). Indian Kanoon

 

8. Gupta para 38 — you were absolutely right to flag this

Now we come to your original point.

Para 38

The Court says:

the deemed-conveyance order is not final as to the rights and entitlements of the parties.

Therefore:

the petitioners’ right to file a civil suit challenging the conveyance is not barred. Indian Kanoon

This is a very important qualification.

It means:

DDR order  final adjudication of title.

9. Gupta para 39 does NOT contradict para 38

It is doing something different.

Para 39 essentially says:

Even though the DDR order is not final as to title, the High Court presently sees no reason to interfere with it.

The Court says that:

• the Society has acquired title under the deemed conveyance;
• this facilitates redevelopment;
• if the petitioners’ argument were accepted, they could ultimately acquire ownership of the redeveloped building after the lease expires in 2072;
• in these peculiar circumstances, the order appears just and proper. Indian Kanoon

Then para 40:

“I find no reason to interfere in the impugned order.”

So the logical structure is:

Para 37: No natural-justice violation on these facts.

Para 38: Even so, deemed conveyance does not finally adjudicate title; civil suit remains available.

Para 39: Nevertheless, considering the particular facts, the High Court finds the order just/proper and sees no reason to interfere.

Para 40: Petition dismissed.

That is not a contradiction.

10. But there is a subtle point which may be very useful to you

There is an apparent tension within Gupta itself between para 25 and para 26.

Para 25

The Court quotes A.H. Wadia Trust approvingly:

Society gets only whatever right, title and interest the promoter possesses.

If the promoter only has leasehold rights, ordinarily the Society can only get leasehold rights. Indian Kanoon

Para 26

Then the Court immediately says:

But these particular landowners were themselves promoters.

Therefore, their ownership can be conveyed because that ownership is the promoter’s own right/title/interest. Indian Kanoon

This is the bridge.

So Gupta is not saying:

“A society can always obtain ownership from a mere lessor.”

It is saying:

A mere lessor would not necessarily be exposed in the same way; but where the lessor itself qualifies as a promoter under Section 2(c), its ownership can become subject to Section 11.

That is a much narrower proposition.

11. And this makes Gupta para 30 especially important

The Court gives the test.

The lessor becomes a promoter because:

1. the lessor participated in causing construction;
2. the lease contained provisions concerning the construction;
3. the lessor would ultimately become owner of the building;
4. therefore someone had to bear the MOFA obligation concerning the building;
5. hence the lessor had to be brought within Section 2(c). Indian Kanoon

This is much more than simply saying:

“Landowner = promoter.”

It is a fact-dependent test.

12. The real comparison for your case

If you are examining whether Gupta can be used to defeat or distinguish Gerald, I would put the propositions this way:

Proposition 1 — Gerald

A DDR cannot deprive an owner of property rights through a deemed-conveyance proceeding without giving that owner an effective opportunity of hearing.

Strongly supported by paras 18–23 and the final order. Indian Kanoon

Proposition 2 — Gupta

If the landowner is itself a promoter under Section 2(c), Section 11 can require conveyance of the landowner-promoter’s own right, title and interest.

Supported by paras 21–30 and 34–35. Indian Kanoon

Proposition 3 — Gupta para 38

Even when a deemed conveyance is upheld in writ jurisdiction, it does not conclusively determine substantive title.

Civil proceedings remain available. Indian Kanoon

Proposition 4 — Gupta para 39

The existence of a civil remedy does not automatically require the High Court to quash the deemed-conveyance order.

The Court may decline writ interference on the particular facts. Indian Kanoon

13. One particularly important difference in the facts

There is a potentially decisive distinction if your argument involves a landowner who merely granted a lease.

Gupta itself says, in substance:

If the intention was simply to grant a lease of vacant land with permission to construct, the landowner may not be treated as promoter.

It was the additional participation and contractual arrangement that caused the Court to treat the Gupta landowners as promoters. Indian Kanoon

That sentence in para 29 is extremely important.

So if your factual documents show:

• ordinary lease;
• no participation by lessor in construction;
• no control over construction;
• no obligation to insure/supervise construction;
• no contractual arrangement for lessor to acquire ownership of the building;
• no agreement by lessor to perfect title for flat purchasers;

then Gupta’s promoter reasoning is materially distinguishable.

Bottom line

The strongest reading of the two judgments is:

Gerald protects the procedural right of the owner to a genuine hearing before the DDR exercises Section 11 powers.

Gupta addresses a different substantive question: whether a landowner who has assumed the characteristics of a promoter can itself be subjected to Section 11.

Gupta does not eliminate Gerald’s natural-justice principle, and Gupta para 38 expressly preserves the distinction between a deemed-conveyance order and final adjudication of title.

para 38 and para 39 should not be read as saying the same thing. Para 38 is about the legal effect/finality of deemed conveyance; para 39 is about the High Court’s discretionary decision not to interfere with this particular DDR order.

10. The crucial factual comparison

Gupta — para 40

The Court:

1. found no reason to interfere with the DDR order;
2. dismissed the writ petition;
3. imposed no costs.

It held that the deemed conveyance could stand, while also recognising that the deemed-conveyance order is not necessarily final as to substantive title disputes, which can still be pursued in appropriate civil proceedings.

Sr No	Facts	Gerald	Gupta
1	Original landowners	Multiple co-owners	One original owner, later heirs
2	Leasehold structure	Yes	Yes
3	Society had leasehold-related rights	Yes/claimed	Yes— assignment in 1978
4	Society sought deemed conveyance	Yes	Yes
5.	All owners effectively before DDR?	No	Court found notice was received
6	Landowners participated in construction?	Not finally decided	Yes, according to Court’s factual finding
7	Landowners treated as promoters?	Not finally determined	Yes
8	Multiple promoters?	Issue not finally adjudicated	Yes
9	Existing assignment prevented Section 11 jurisdiction?	Not finally decided	No
10	Natural justice violation	Yes	No, on these facts
11	DDR order	Quashed	Upheld
12	Matter remanded	Yes	No

 

11. The most important legal distinction

If you put the two judgments together, I would formulate the distinction like this:

Gerald Michael Misquitta does not establish that a landowner can never be subjected to deemed conveyance merely because he is an original owner or because the promoter holds only leasehold rights. The judgment principally turns on the failure of the Competent Authority to join and hear the affected co-owners and to undertake the statutory enquiry under Section 11(4).

Conversely:

Rohini/Mohini Gupta addresses the substantive question left open in Gerald: where the landowner has himself participated in or caused the construction, he can fall within the expanded definition of “promoter” under Section 2(c) MOFA. In such a case, the society can seek the rights of that promoter under Section 11, notwithstanding an earlier assignment of leasehold rights by another promoter.

That is why the Gupta judgment does not necessarily overrule or contradict Gerald. The two decisions operate on materially different factual findings.

Participation factor is a legal fiction and not statute. The Parliament must come out with a policy or amend the MOFA. 

One caution

There is also a chronological point: Gerald was decided on 25 February 2026, whereas Gupta was decided on 8 September 2026. Gupta therefore had the benefit of the later jurisprudence cited in it, including Haresh Vijaysinh Bhatia, and expressly developed the “multiple promoters/landowner as promoter” analysis.

Gerald + Gupta in a case against a DDR deemed-conveyance order, the strongest way to analyse them is not simply “one says quash, one says uphold.” The decisive questions are (1) was the landowner actually a promoter under Section 2(c), (2) what exactly did the Section 4 agreements provide, (3) what rights had already been assigned, (4) was there failure under Section 11(1), and (5) were all persons whose rights were affected actually given a meaningful hearing.

Conclusion:

Para 38 expressly preserves/reserves the Gupta petitioners’ right to approach the civil court and establish their substantive title/rights. That point is important, and I would phrase the effect more precisely than I did earlier.

The judgment relies on Arunkumar H. Shah HUF v. Avon Arcade Premises Co-operative Society Ltd. for the proposition that a deemed-conveyance proceeding under Section 11 does not finally adjudicate substantive title disputes. The Gupta petitioners therefore retain the right to seek adjudication of those rights in a civil suit.

The distinction between paras 38 and 39

Para 38 = reservation of the Gupta family’s substantive remedy

In substance, the Court is saying:

The deemed conveyance does not finally settle the title dispute; the petitioners can still go to the civil court.

So dismissal of the writ petition does NOT mean the Court has finally declared that the Gupta family has no title or no enforceable rights.

Para 39 = why the High Court nevertheless does not quash the DDR order

The Court then considers the practical/factual position and says that, for purposes of the writ petition, it finds no reason to interfere with the deemed conveyance. The Court considers the conveyance just/fair in the peculiar circumstances, including the redevelopment implications. LinkedIn

So the legal position is:

DDR deemed-conveyance order
↓
Writ petition dismissed
↓
BUT
↓
Guptas’ substantive title dispute remains open
↓
Civil suit remains available

That is a very significant qualification.

The recent commentary on the judgment also correctly identifies para 38 as preserving the petitioners’ civil-suit remedy despite dismissal of the writ.

One important consequence

This means Gupta should not be cited as a judgment finally declaring that the Gupta family had no title to the land.

Rather, the judgment says, in effect:

For the purpose of Section 11/MOFA and the writ challenge, the DDR was entitled to issue the deemed conveyance because the Court treated the Guptas as promoters. But whether the Guptas ultimately have substantive proprietary rights is not finally adjudicated by the deemed-conveyance proceedings and remains open to civil adjudication.

That distinction is, in my view, the most important point in para 38.

And it becomes particularly important when comparing Gupta with Gerald: Gerald says the DDR process itself was defective; Gupta says the process/order will not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction, while simultaneously leaving the underlying title dispute open.

It is now wisdom of Courts to finally decide this issue of right of landowners that is Lessors. Members will vacate flats in expectation of getting big houses with modern amenities. But if after demolition of building if there is a Stay Order , people will be deprived of the property without due process of law.

It is a fit case for Bombay High Court to take up reference suo motu. It is also necessary to decide scope of definition of the term Promoter in the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act 1963 in conjunction with Section 11 thereof and Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882.

Gerald Michael Misquitta — full judgment

Rohini Gupta & Anr. — full judgment 

 

24^th September 2026