PRESIDENT’S POWER TO ADJUDICATE UPON ELECTION PETITION
Why we are discussing this issue? Opening Remarks: In 2024 Lok Sabha general election was held in May. This was the 18th Lok Sabha election. All political parties offered in manifesto many promises. Freebies are offered by almost all political parties. In Delhi the local state government is sworn in thrice based on freebies. Similarly in Karnataka and Telangana the state government is elected based on freebies. The disadvantage of such freebies is the economy of the State is pulled back due to nonproductive expenses. The taxpayers do not get more advance facilities from the tax they have paid. PIL challenging freebies is pending before the Supreme Court. During Lok Sabha election we saw that one of the parties Congress have distributed a guaranteed cards along with the forms that if they come to power, they will give Rs.8500/- to every woman and Rs.1,000,00/- per year to meet major expenses. This party has won more seats than last two elections and there was religious concentration of votes. There was also a statement that the party if come to power would confiscate entire wealth and do caste survey and thereafter redistribute the same. The congress party won 99 Lok Sabha seats. However, they are in power in three states. Telangana, Himachal and Karnataka. They can offer them. But women who were given guarantee cards along with form started Queuing up outside Congress Party offices. They said we have lost. The question arise now is whether this is a blatant fraud? What does law say? The law which governs election is the Representation of peoples Act 1951 ( Said RP Act 1951) The question is whether all this statements go against the provisions of Section 123 of RP Act 1951 ? A complaint is pending before the President of India challenging election. Now question arises Can third party challenge in representative character the election of candidates who belong to a single largest party who won election on basis of guaranteed card? Who has jurisdiction to hear the election Petition under Section 123 and 8A of RP Act 1951? Does President of India have power under Section 123 or 8 A of the said R.P. Act 1951? This Act came into force on 17th July 1951. Preamble of the Act explains the purpose of its enactment. An Act to provide for the conduct of elections to the Houses of Parliament and to the House or Houses of the Legislature of each State, the qualifications and disqualifications for membership of those Houses, the corrupt 1*** practices and other offences at or in connection with such elections and the decision of doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with such elections. The terms corrupt practices is defined in the Act as “corrupt practice means any of the practices specified in section 123” What does corrupt practices mean. Section 123 in The Representation of the People Act, 1951 provides for the same. Corrupt practices.— The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act:— (1)“Bribery”, that is to say— (A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate […]
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WHAT HAPPENS WHEN MAKER OF THE WILL DIRECTS TO PAY THE EXECUTOR FROM A PARTICULAR FUND? CAN COURT ISSUE A PROBATE?
To understand the case query we must first learn the provisions of the Indian Succession Act of 1925 IS AN EXECUTOR A TRUSTEE? “There is a distinction between a trustee and an executor, in that the former has only the power to pay what is vested in him as trustee to the persons for whose use he holds it, but has no general power to receive and pay what is due to and from the estate, which is the office of the latter (vide paragraph 13, p. 12 of Williams). The same proposition appears in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd Edn., Vol. 16, p. 124, in paragraph 180)” Provisions of Indian Succession Act 1925 Sec 222: Probate only to appoint an executor. (1) Probate shall be granted only to an executor appointed by the will. (2) The appointment may be expressed or by necessary implication. Illustrations (i) A wills that C be his executor if B will not. B is appointed executor by implication. (ii) A gives a legacy to B and several legacies to other persons, among the rest to his daughter-in-law C, and adds “but should the within-named C be not living I do constitute and appoint B my whole and sole executrix”. C is appointed executrix by implication. (iii) A appoints several persons executors of his will and codicils and his nephew residuary legatee, and in another codicil are these words,– “I appoint my nephew my residuary legatee to discharge all lawful demands against my will and codicils signed of different dates”. The nephew is appointed an executor by implication. Grant of administration of universal or residuary legatees.— When—(a)the deceased has made a Will, but has not appointed an executor, or (b)the deceased has appointed an executor who is legally incapable or refuses to act, or who has died before the testator or before he has proved the Will, or (c)the executor dies after having proved the will, but before he has administered all the estate of the deceased, a universal or a residuary legatee may be admitted proving the Will and letters of administration with the Will annexed may be granted to him of the whole estate, or of so much thereof as may be unadministered. Narration: Thus, the test for finding out whether a person is an executor according to the tenor is to find out whether he is, by necessary implication, nominated by the testator in his stead to generally administer the estate and to pay the testator’s debts and to receive his dues in the performance of his will. An executor is placed in the stead of the testator and he has the right of action against the testator’s debtors and has also the right to dispose of the goods of the testator towards the payment of his debts and the performance of his will. An executor need not be expressly nominated; and if by necessary implication the testator recommends or commits to one or more the charge and office, or the rights which appertain to an executor, it amounts to as much as the ordaining or constituting him or them to be […]
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Reversionary Rights under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882: Transferability, Registration, and the Challenge of Deemed Conveyance
Section 54 in The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 “Sale” defined.— “Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made- Such transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upmade. — or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. Contract for sale. —A contract for the sale of immoveable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. What is Reversionary Right? Reversionary rights refer to the legal right of an original property owner (or their heirs) to automatically regain full ownership and possession of a property after a temporary transfer for example such as a lease, life estate, or conditional grant expires. The original owner (the reversioner) retains ultimate title while granting temporary possession to someone else. Possession legally returns to the original owner immediately when the specified timeframe or condition ends. A reversion does not require a new transfer or sale deed; it is simply the return of the original owner’s fully active rights. How Reversion Works in Different Scenarios? Lease Agreements: When a fixed-term lease ends (e.g., a 99-year lease), the physical possession and use of the property automatically revert to the landlord or lessor. Life Interest Estates: An owner can transfer a property to someone strictly for use during their lifetime. Upon that person’s death, the property reverts to the original owner or their legal heirs. Conditional Transfers: If a property is gifted or transferred on the condition that it must be used for a specific purpose (e.g., running a school), breaking that condition causes the property to revert to the transferor. The Critical Legal Distinction Reversion: The property returns to the original grantor or their direct heirs. Remainder: The property passes forward to a designated third party after the temporary interest ends (e.g., “To Person A for life, and then to Person B”). What is the Procedure to Transfer Reversioner interest? A reversionary interest can be legally transferred to a third party through a registered deed of conveyance, as it is recognized as a transferable future interest under Indian law. Legal Validity of Transferring Reversionary Interest Assignable Right: Under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, property of any kind may be transferred except as otherwise provided. A reversionary interest is a vested future interest, not a mere spes successionis (chance of an heir succeeding), making it legally assignable OBITER : Registered Document Vishwa Nath And Anr. vs Board of Revenue And Ors. on 18 May, 2004 The question posed is as to […]
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Lease or Agreement to Lease? A Case Analysis of Deepak Fertilizers v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority
Deepak Fertilizers and Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority & Ors., Writ Petition No. 5635 of 2005, decided on 18 December 2025 by Justice Abhay Ahuja. (Verdictum) Background and Facts The dispute arose from an agreement executed on 13 October 1995 between Deepak Fertilizers and CIDCO under a scheme through which CIDCO allotted developed residential plots to industries for construction of staff housing. The material facts were: CIDCO announced a housing scheme for industries in Navi Mumbai. Deepak Fertilizers applied for a plot for construction of residential accommodation for its employees. CIDCO allotted a plot and the parties executed an Agreement dated 13 October 1995. The agreement contemplated that: the company would satisfy several conditions; construction had to be completed within stipulated time; only after compliance would a formal lease deed be executed. Possession given to the company was only for limited purposes connected with development and construction under the agreement. The Collector of Stamps held that the agreement itself amounted to a lease and demanded ad valorem stamp duty as applicable to leases. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority dismissed the company’s appeal. Deepak Fertilizers challenged those orders before the Bombay High Court. (Verdictum) Procedural History Authority Decision Collector of Stamps Held the agreement was a lease and liable to stamp duty as a lease Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Confirmed Collector’s order Bombay High Court Allowed the writ petition and set aside both orders Legal Issue The central legal issue was: Whether the Agreement dated 13 October 1995 created a present lease (demise) attracting stamp duty as a “Lease” under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, or whether it was merely an executory agreement to grant a lease in future. In simple words: Did the document itself create leasehold rights? or Was it only a promise that a lease would be executed later after conditions were fulfilled? Petitioner’s Arguments Deepak Fertilizers argued that: the document repeatedly described itself as an Agreement; it did not transfer any present interest in land; no leasehold estate came into existence immediately; execution of a future lease deed was expressly contemplated; possession was limited and conditional; therefore the agreement could not be stamped as a lease. The company relied upon earlier Bombay High Court decisions distinguishing between: agreement to lease actual lease Respondents’ Arguments The Revenue and CIDCO contended that: possession had already been handed over; the company had substantial rights over the property; practical enjoyment had commenced; therefore the agreement should be treated as a lease for stamp purposes. Core Legal Question Considered by the Court The Court examined a classical property law distinction: Does the document itself create a present demise? If yes → it is a lease. If no → it is merely an agreement to lease. This distinction has existed in Indian property law for decades. Court’s Reasoning Justice Abhay Ahuja analysed the document clause-by-clause. The Court emphasized that the substance of the document—not merely possession or nomenclature—determines its legal character. (Verdictum) No Present Transfer of Interest The Court observed that: ownership remained with CIDCO; no present leasehold estate was transferred; the agreement only created contractual obligations. This is the most important […]
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Maharashtra Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2026 – Key Amendments Explained Q and A
Description: Learn about the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2026, including changes to Sections 73AAA, 73B, 73C, 73CB, 73F, 81 and 157, their legal implications, and what co-operative societies need to do to comply. Maharashtra Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2026: What Every Co-operative Society Should Know The Maharashtra Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2026 has introduced several important changes to the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. Although the amendments are limited to a few provisions, they significantly impact the governance, election process, committee administration, and regulatory compliance of co-operative societies across Maharashtra. The amendments primarily strengthen the role of the State Co-operative Election Authority (SCEA), streamline the procedure for filling committee vacancies, update audit thresholds, and improve transparency in the management of co-operative societies. Whether you are a committee member, housing society office bearer, director of a credit society, auditor, advocate, chartered accountant, or consultant, understanding these amendments is essential for ensuring statutory compliance. Why Was the Amendment Necessary? The co-operative sector in Maharashtra is one of the largest in India, comprising housing societies, credit societies, consumer societies, agricultural societies, industrial co-operatives, and numerous other institutions. Over the years, practical issues emerged relating to: delays in filling committee vacancies; disputes concerning multiple-seat elections; lack of uniform supervision during committee proceedings; ambiguity regarding election authorities; and outdated financial thresholds. The Amendment Act addresses these concerns by introducing clearer procedures and strengthening institutional oversight. Key Amendments Introduced by the 2026 Amendment Act Amendment to Section 73AAA – Exemption for Type “A” Societies The first proviso to Section 73AAA(3) has been deleted. Further, the second proviso has been amended to exclude committees of Type “A” Societies prescribed under Rule 4 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies (Election to Committee) Rules, 2014. Practical Impact The amendment differentiates Type “A” societies from other classes of co-operative societies for the purpose of this provision. Societies falling within this category should carefully examine whether the amended provision applies to them before initiating committee-related actions. Amendments to Sections 73B and 73C – Greater Election Supervision Sections 73B and 73C deal with representation of reserved categories on the managing committee. The Amendment Act now provides that whenever vacancies are filled under these provisions, the committee meeting must be presided over by an officer authorized by the State Co-operative Election Authority (SCEA). Why This Matters Earlier, committee meetings were conducted internally, which occasionally resulted in procedural disputes. Independent supervision by an authorized election officer is expected to: improve transparency; reduce allegations of bias; ensure procedural compliance; and increase confidence in the election process. Amendment to Section 73CB – Clarification of Election Authorities Section 73CB contains provisions relating to election administration. The Explanation has now been amended by specifically referring to: Divisional Co-operative Election Officers; District Co-operative Election Officers; Taluka Co-operative Election Officers; Ward Co-operative Election Officers; Observers; and Zonal Officers. Importance The amendment removes ambiguity by expressly identifying the authorities responsible for election-related functions. This provides greater administrative certainty during election proceedings. Complete Substitution of Section 73F – Election to Multiple Committee Seats One of the most significant amendments is the complete substitution of Section 73F. Earlier Position The earlier provision did […]
Read moreTransfers Beyond Statutory Ceiling Limits: Supreme Court Explains the Scope of Section 154 Violations
Supreme Court Clarifies the Nature of Transfers Violating Section 154 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act: In Arafat Ali (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Haridwar & Ors. Introduction In a significant judgment delivered on 23 June 2026, the Supreme Court of India in Arafat Ali (Dead) Through Legal Representatives & Others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Haridwar & Others settled an important question concerning agricultural land transfers under the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (“UPZA&LR Act”). The Court examined whether a transfer executed in violation of Section 154 of the Act is void from its inception or merely voidable through appropriate legal proceedings. The ruling provides much-needed clarity for landowners, purchasers, revenue authorities, and practitioners dealing with consolidation and agricultural land disputes in Uttar Pradesh. FACTS OF THE CASE The dispute arose during consolidation proceedings relating to agricultural land transfers allegedly made in contravention of Section 154 of the UPZA&LR Act. The provision restricts acquisition and transfer of agricultural land beyond prescribed statutory limits to prevent excessive concentration of landholdings. The central issue before the Court was whether such transfers automatically become legally non-existent (void ab initio) or continue to have legal effect unless and until challenged before a competent authority. LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED The Supreme Court was called upon to determine: Whether a transfer of agricultural land made in violation of Section 154 of the UPZA&LR Act is void ab initio or merely voidable under the statutory framework. The answer to this question carries substantial consequences for land titles, mutation entries, consolidation proceedings, and rights of subsequent purchasers. SUPREME COURT’S FINDINGS The Supreme Court held that a transfer made in contravention of Section 154 is not void ab initio. Instead, such a transfer is voidable and remains effective unless it is challenged and set aside through legally prescribed procedures. THE COURT EMPHASIZED THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES: Violation of Section 154 Does Not Automatically Nullify the Transfer A transaction executed in breach of the statutory restriction does not cease to exist in the eyes of law merely because the provision has been violated. The transfer continues to operate unless competent proceedings are initiated to invalidate it. Distinction Between Void and Voidable Transactions The judgment reiterates the well-established legal distinction: Void Transaction: A transaction having no legal existence from the very beginning. Voidable Transaction: A transaction that remains valid and enforceable until annulled by a competent authority or court. By classifying transfers violating Section 154 as voidable, the Court protected the principle of legal certainty in property transactions. Applicability of Law Existing on the Date of Transfer The Court observed that the validity of a transfer must ordinarily be assessed with reference to the legal position prevailing on the date of execution of the sale deed or transfer instrument. Appropriate Statutory Remedies Must Be Invoked The Court clarified that challenges to such transfers must be pursued through the mechanisms contemplated under the statute, including proceedings that may be initiated by competent authorities or the Gaon Sabha where applicable. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JUDGMENT […]
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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF SMEAR CAMPAIGNS: CONSTITUTIONAL, CIVIL, AND REGULATORY RESPONSES ACROSS COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS
SUBJECT: SMEAR CAMPAIGNS AND THE LAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDIA, THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND SINGAPORE It is obvious that, youths learn from what is talked in public. The icons are leaders, actors, politicians and those who are in public life. It’s easy in India to smear someone’s reputation. Reason is weak provisions. In India opposition leader who come from high profile family uses all his conveniences and power to disrepute and threaten all Competent Authorities. But he escapes without a scratch. Dialogues in Hindi movies like “kya karlega tera kanoon” also played important role. In my childhood we were taught by mothers not to say insulting or false about others. It was considered as sin. However it appears that deity of Karma is also tired of dealing with falsehood and false public allegations. There is a wait list for justice there too. A famous bhajan ” ninda a kare keni re” loved by Bapu is forgotten. With this common parlance discussion lets turn to the legal discussion. USA: UAE-Backed Dark PR (2023): The United Arab Emirates (UAE) hired Swiss firm Alp Services to conduct a covert, multi-year smear campaign targeting a US-based businessman, Hazim Nada, and his commodities-trading firm, Lord Energy. The campaign manipulated markets and successfully forced the company into liquidation by spreading false allegations of terrorist. ( check https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/can-an-american-hold-the-united-arab-emirates-responsible-for-a-smear-campaign) Martin Luther King Jr. FBI Surveillance (1960s): The FBI under J. Edgar Hoover orchestrated a massive, covert operation to discredit Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., labelling him a subversive. The agency sent defamatory packages, wiretapped his communications, and urged him to commit suicide to silence his activism. ( check: https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-releases-report-fbi-crusade-against-martin-luther-king-jr-urges-ashcroft-not ) Planned Parenthood Foetal Tissue Controversy (2015): Anti-abortion groups released deceptively edited videos to accuse Planned Parenthood of illegally selling foetal tissue for profit. The healthcare organization denounced the effort as a fabricated smear campaign designed to cut off their federal funding. ( check https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34396751) UNITED KINGDOM: The Sir David Attenborough Climate Campaign (2019–2023): Following the release of the Netflix documentary Our Planet, which featured footage of Pacific walruses falling to their deaths, climate change deniers initiated a widespread smear campaign against Attenborough. The attackers falsely alleged that he and the production crew fabricated the tragedy to artificially push climate change narratives. (https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/news/climate-change-deniers-continue-smear-campaign-against-sir-david-attenborough/) The Labour Together Corporate Intelligence Report (2024–2026): In a major political controversy, it was revealed that the UK think tank Labour Together commissioned a US public relations firm (APCO) to compile a 58-page report, codenamed “Operation Cannon”. The report targeted journalists at the Sunday Times who were investigating the group’s campaign funding and attempted to discredit them by alleging foreign interference and making personal attacks. SINGAPORE Singtel vs. Telco Rivals (2015) The Incident: Telecommunications giant Singtel and social media agency Gushcloud were exposed for running an orchestrated online smear campaign against rival telcos StarHub and M1. Details: Bloggers were paid and incentivized to fabricate complaints and criticize the network connections of the rival telcos. Resolution: Following whistleblowing by blogger Xiaxue, Singtel’s CEO publicly apologized, the responsible employees were fired, and the Infocomm Development Authority (IDA) issued a stern warning to the telco. (check https://www.campaignasia.com/article/ethical-crackdown-regulating-singapores-influencer-scene/2xnaatoej5nqkwmj28qr5s2lyl) […]
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CAN A COURT STOP A PARTY FROM SPEAKING? LESSONS FROM LILAVATI TRUST v. HDFC BANK
INTRODUCTION The Bombay High Court recently dealt with an important issue arising in a high-profile dispute between the Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust and HDFC Bank. The Trust instituted a defamation suit against HDFC Bank and its officials and sought interim relief restraining the defendants from making further statements allegedly affecting the reputation of the Trust and its trustees. The Court declined to grant the interim injunction. Although the final rights of the parties will be decided at trial, the order raises an important question: Can a person obtain a court order preventing another person from speaking merely because the statements are alleged to be defamatory? The answer, according to long-settled principles of Indian law, is generally no. WHY IS THIS CASE IMPORTANT? Many litigants believe that once a defamation suit is filed, the Court will immediately restrain the opposite party from making further statements. However, Indian courts have consistently adopted a cautious approach while granting injunctions in defamation matters. An injunction restricting speech is considered a serious remedy because it directly affects the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Consequently, courts insist upon a very high threshold before issuing what is effectively a “gag order”. THE REAL ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT The dispute before the Court was not whether the statements were ultimately true or false. The issue was much narrower: Here are the Prayers sought: the prayers in the Suit that forms the basis of IA 3095 are extracted below: i. A Decree may be passed for Permanent Perpetual Injunction in favour of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants thereby restraining the Defendants, their representatives, employees, agents, heirs, or any other person from vilifying ,maligning, tarnishing, levelling scathing allegations and casting aspersions upon the reputation, good will and image of the Plaintiffs and family through any medium whatsoever; ii. The Defendants and their representatives may be permanently restrained from circulating/publishing/ uploading any defamatory content harming/injuring or damaging the reputation of the Plaintiffs on any social media intermediaries; iii. Pending the hearing and final disposal of the present Suit, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to restrain the Defendants, their representatives, employees, agents, heirs, or any other person from vilifying, maligning, tarnishing, levelling scathing allegations and casting aspersions upon the reputation, good will and image of the Plaintiffs and family through any medium whatsoever; iv. That pending the hearing and final disposal of the present Suit, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct the Defendants and media channels including the X Corp/Defendant No. 5 (X. Com, formerly known as Twitter) and Meta Platforms Inc. (FaceBook)/ Defendant No. 6 to remove all defamatory and libelous articles/materials from all accounts, which has been published in any form against the Plaintiff and Mr. Prashant Mehta and his family; v. That pending the hearing and final disposal of the present Suit, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct the Defendant No.1 i.e., the HDFC Bank to remove the Media Statement and the Press Release from the website of theDefendant No. 1 Bank (which are accessible at)i.e.,https://www.hdfcbank.com/personal/about-us/news-room/press-release/2025/q2/media-statement and https://www.hdfcbank.com/ vi. That this Hon’ble Court […]
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H-1B VISA CASE AN ANALYSIS
EXECUTIVE TAXATION AND THE LIMITS OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA ET AL. V. MULLIN ET AL. Introduction In State of California et al. v. Mullin et al., U.S. District Judge Leo T. Sorokin invalidated a federal policy requiring employers to pay an additional $100,000 when filing certain H-1B visa petitions. The decision raises important questions regarding the constitutional allocation of taxing authority, the scope of executive power under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Court’s Constitutional Analysis At the center of the dispute was whether the $100,000 payment constituted a permissible regulatory fee or an unauthorized tax. Judge Sorokin concluded that the surcharge functioned as a tax because it was not reasonably related to the government’s costs of processing or administering H-1B petitions. Instead, the payment was designed to influence employer behavior and generate revenue. The court emphasized the Constitution’s allocation of taxing power to Congress. Because Congress had not expressly authorized the executive branch to impose such a charge, the policy violated fundamental separation-of-powers principles. The ruling reinforces the proposition that the executive cannot create new fiscal obligations absent clear legislative authorization. Statutory Authority Under the INA The government argued that Sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA provided sufficient authority for the surcharge. These provisions grant the President broad discretion to restrict the entry of non-citizens when deemed detrimental to U.S. interests. The court rejected this interpretation, holding that while the provisions authorize restrictions on entry, they do not authorize the imposition of substantial monetary obligations on domestic employers. The decision reflects judicial reluctance to infer expansive fiscal powers from broadly worded immigration statutes. Administrative Procedure Act Concerns The court further held that the policy violated the APA because it was implemented without notice-and-comment rule-making. The administration relied on guidance documents, memoranda, and related agency materials to establish the surcharge. Judge Sorokin determined that these actions effectively created binding legal obligations and therefore constituted legislative rule-making subject to APA procedural requirements. Additionally, the court found the policy arbitrary and capricious. The government failed to provide a reasoned explanation for selecting the $100,000 amount and did not adequately evaluate the consequences for employers, universities, hospitals, and research institutions. Conclusion The decision serves as a significant reaffirmation of constitutional limits on executive authority. By characterizing the surcharge as a tax rather than a fee, the court underscored Congress’s exclusive role in taxation and signaled that broad immigration powers cannot be used to circumvent legislative control over fiscal policy. Authors view : While the Trump administration did not formally single out Indians in its immigration policies, changes to the H-1B visa program had a disproportionate impact on Indian nationals, who make up the majority of H-1B recipients. Increased fees, tighter scrutiny, and stricter eligibility standards were presented as measures to safeguard American jobs and reduce dependence on foreign labour. Critics contended that these policies created significant challenges for skilled Indian professionals and the technology firms that rely on them. VIEWS OF PRESIDENT OF USA Link to entire case with complaint, motion and Judgment https://www.doj.state.or.us/oregon-department-of-justice/federal-oversight/federal-litigation-tracker/h-1b-visa-petition-fees-california-v-noem-d-mass/?utm_source=chatgpt.com […]
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ASSIGNMENT OF LEASEHOLD RIGHTS UNDER GST: ANALYSIS OF LUNA CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. V. UNION OF INDIA (GUJARAT HIGH COURT)
Introduction The Gujarat High Court’s decision in Luna Chemical Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India has added another significant chapter to the ongoing debate concerning the GST implications of transfers of leasehold rights in industrial plots. The judgment reaffirms the principle that a transfer of leasehold rights by an existing lessee is fundamentally different from the original grant of lease by a statutory authority and cannot automatically be subjected to GST as a supply of service. The ruling is particularly relevant for industries operating in Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC) estates and for taxpayers involved in the transfer of long-term leasehold interests in industrial land. Background of the Dispute Luna Chemical Industries Pvt. Ltd. held leasehold rights in an industrial plot allotted through the GIDC framework. Subsequently, the company assigned its leasehold rights to another entity after obtaining the requisite approvals from GIDC. The GST authorities initiated proceedings under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, alleging that the assignment of leasehold rights constituted a taxable supply of services and consequently raised a demand for GST. The petitioner challenged the demand before the Gujarat High Court. CORE LEGAL ISSUE The principal question before the Court was: Whether the assignment of leasehold rights in an industrial plot by a lessee to a third party constitutes a taxable supply of services under the GST regime. The answer depended upon the characterization of the transaction. If the transaction represented a supply of service, GST would be leviable. Conversely, if it constituted a transfer of an interest in immovable property, it would fall outside the scope of taxable supplies. RATIO DECIDENDI The Court held that the transfer of leasehold rights by an existing lessee is legally distinct from the original lease granted by GIDC. The ratio of the decision may be summarized as follows: The assignment of long-term leasehold rights by a lessee results in the transfer of an existing interest in immovable property and does not amount to a taxable supply of services merely because the original allotment was made through a lease arrangement. Consequently, GST cannot be imposed on such assignment solely by treating it as a continuation of the original leasing transaction. Distinction between Lease and Assignment A key aspect of the judgment is the Court’s recognition of the legal distinction between: Original Lease by GIDC GIDC grants the right to use and enjoy immovable property while retaining ownership. Such a transaction may be characterized as a supply of service under GST. Subsequent Assignment by the Lessee The lessee transfers its existing leasehold interest to another person. The assignor divests itself of the rights held in the property. The transaction involves transfer of an interest in immovable property rather than provision of a service. The Court emphasized that these are two separate legal transactions and cannot be treated identically for GST purposes. Reliance on Earlier Precedent The judgment follows the Gujarat High Court’s earlier ruling in Gujarat Chamber of Commerce & Industry v. Union of India, where the Court had examined the GST treatment of leasehold interests in industrial plots. By relying on the principles laid […]
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Electoral Rolls and the Foundations of Democracy: Reflections on the Supreme Court’s 2025 Judgment
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: The Supreme Court of India’s 2025 judgment in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India begins not with procedural technicalities, but with a profound constitutional question: who constitutes the political community of a democracy? Before a state can count votes, the Court observes, it must first determine whose votes are entitled to be counted. In this framing, the electoral roll emerges not as a routine administrative document, but as the legal foundation of representative government itself. Chief Justice Surya Kant, writing for the Court, situates the controversy within a long historical and philosophical tradition. The judgment emphasizes that disputes concerning electoral rolls are inseparable from the legitimacy of democratic governance. Every democracy must define the body of citizens who may participate in collective political decision-making. Electoral registration, therefore, becomes an issue of constitutional identity rather than mere bureaucracy. What makes the introduction especially striking is its historical sweep. The Court traces India’s democratic inheritance back to the ancient republics of the Gangetic plains, particularly the Vajji confederacy centered around Vaishali in present-day Bihar. During the Mahajanapada period, approximately the sixth and fifth centuries BCE, the region witnessed both monarchies and non-monarchical political systems. While Magadha and Anga represented kingship, the Vajji polity embodied forms of collective governance and assembly-based decision-making. Drawing upon the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, the judgment describes the Vajjis as conducting frequent assemblies, deliberating in concord, and operating according to established institutions. Although these republics did not practice universal adult suffrage in the modern constitutional sense, they nonetheless required mechanisms to determine who could participate in governance. Participation was often restricted by lineage, rank, or status, yet the central political problem remained familiar: defining membership within the governing community. ( CURTSY wikipidea) ( The Mahāparinibbāna Sutta is Sutta 16 in the Dīgha Nikāya, a scripture belonging to the Sutta Piṭaka of Theravāda Buddhism. It concerns the end of Gautama Buddha’s life – his parinibbāna – and is the longest sutta of the Pāli Canon. Because of its attention to detail, it has been resorted to as the principal source of reference in most standard accounts of the Buddha’s death) This historical exploration serves an important constitutional purpose. By invoking ancient republican traditions, the Court underscores that the question of political inclusion has deep roots in Indian civilization. The legitimacy of governance has long depended upon recognized procedures for identifying participants in public affairs. Modern electoral rolls are therefore part of a much older democratic continuum, though transformed by constitutional principles of equality and universal suffrage. The judgment’s introductory reasoning also reflects a broader philosophy of constitutional democracy. Representative government does not begin at the polling booth; it begins with inclusion in the electoral process itself. Errors, exclusions, or manipulations in electoral rolls can alter the composition of the electorate and thereby affect democratic legitimacy. In this sense, voter registration is not peripheral to democracy—it is constitutive of it. By grounding its analysis in history, political theory, and constitutional values, the Supreme Court elevates the debate over electoral rolls beyond procedural administration. The judgment reminds us that democracy depends not only on free elections, but also […]
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AUTHORS’ RIGHTS AGAINST PUBLISHERS IN INDIA: NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY, ROYALTY PROTECTION AND LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY
AUTHORS’ RIGHTS AGAINST PUBLISHERS IN INDIA: NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY, ROYALTY PROTECTION AND LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY BY SHRUTI DESAI Abstract The Indian publishing industry has witnessed growing concerns regarding non-payment of royalties, suppression of sales figures, denial of accounts, unauthorized reprints, and exploitative copyright assignments. Many authors, particularly academic and regional-language writers, suffer financial loss because publishers often maintain opaque accounting systems and one-sided publishing agreements. This article examines the legal rights of authors under the Copyright Act, 1957, discusses the right to royalties and rendition of accounts, and analyses important judicial precedents protecting authors against unfair publishing practices. The article also highlights the urgent need for statutory reforms ensuring transparency, accountability, and equitable sharing of publishing revenues. Keywords #Copyright, #royalty, #publishing #agreements, #rendition of #accounts, $authors’rights, #copyright #assignment, #literary works, #publishing industry, #moralrights, #transparency. INTRODUCTION The relationship between an author and a publisher is traditionally founded on trust, transparency, and mutual commercial benefit. However, in India, numerous authors — particularly academic writers, regional-language writers, educational authors, and first-time authors — have repeatedly complained of unfair publishing practices. These include non-payment or delayed payment of royalties, refusal to furnish proper sales statements, under-reporting of print runs, unauthorised reprints, misuse of digital rights, and one-sided copyright assignments. Many authors are compelled to sign standard-form publishing agreements without bargaining power. In several instances, publishers continue commercially exploit literary works while withholding accurate accounts of sales. Such practices not only amount to breach of contract but may also constitute infringement of statutory and moral rights under the Copyright Act, 1957. Indian courts have recognised that authors possess enforceable rights against publishers and licensees, including the right to rendition of accounts and protection against unauthorised exploitation of copyright. Legal Framework Under Indian Copyright Law The principal legislation governing literary rights in India is the Copyright Act, 1957. The Act recognises copyright as a valuable proprietary right and protects authors against unauthorised use of their works. Ownership of Copyright Section 17 of the Copyright Act recognises the author as the first owner of copyright, subject to limited exceptions. Assignment of Copyright Sections 18 and 19 regulate the assignment of copyright. An assignment must: • be in writing; • identify the specific rights assigned; • specify duration and territorial extent; • mention royalty and consideration. Where the duration is not specified, the assignment is deemed to be for five years. If the territorial extent is not specified, it is presumed to extend only within India. The 2012 amendments to the Copyright Act significantly strengthened author protection, especially concerning royalty rights. Royalty Rights of Authors The concept of royalty is central to publishing contracts. Royalty constitutes the author’s share in commercial exploitation of the literary work. Unfortunately, many publishers fail to disclose: • actual print quantities; • reprints; • warehouse stock; • digital sales; • export sales; • online platform sales; • discount structures; • destruction of unsold stock. This results in substantial financial loss to authors. The law increasingly recognizes that authors cannot be deprived of equitable royalty participation. In a significant development, the Calcutta High Court observed that the Copyright Act now recognizes the right of equal […]
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