PRESIDENT’S POWER TO ADJUDICATE UPON ELECTION PETITION
Why we are discussing this issue? Opening Remarks: In 2024 Lok Sabha general election was held in May. This was the 18th Lok Sabha election. All political parties offered in manifesto many promises. Freebies are offered by almost all political parties. In Delhi the local state government is sworn in thrice based on freebies. Similarly in Karnataka and Telangana the state government is elected based on freebies. The disadvantage of such freebies is the economy of the State is pulled back due to nonproductive expenses. The taxpayers do not get more advance facilities from the tax they have paid. PIL challenging freebies is pending before the Supreme Court. During Lok Sabha election we saw that one of the parties Congress have distributed a guaranteed cards along with the forms that if they come to power, they will give Rs.8500/- to every woman and Rs.1,000,00/- per year to meet major expenses. This party has won more seats than last two elections and there was religious concentration of votes. There was also a statement that the party if come to power would confiscate entire wealth and do caste survey and thereafter redistribute the same. The congress party won 99 Lok Sabha seats. However, they are in power in three states. Telangana, Himachal and Karnataka. They can offer them. But women who were given guarantee cards along with form started Queuing up outside Congress Party offices. They said we have lost. The question arise now is whether this is a blatant fraud? What does law say? The law which governs election is the Representation of peoples Act 1951 ( Said RP Act 1951) The question is whether all this statements go against the provisions of Section 123 of RP Act 1951 ? A complaint is pending before the President of India challenging election. Now question arises Can third party challenge in representative character the election of candidates who belong to a single largest party who won election on basis of guaranteed card? Who has jurisdiction to hear the election Petition under Section 123 and 8A of RP Act 1951? Does President of India have power under Section 123 or 8 A of the said R.P. Act 1951? This Act came into force on 17th July 1951. Preamble of the Act explains the purpose of its enactment. An Act to provide for the conduct of elections to the Houses of Parliament and to the House or Houses of the Legislature of each State, the qualifications and disqualifications for membership of those Houses, the corrupt 1*** practices and other offences at or in connection with such elections and the decision of doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with such elections. The terms corrupt practices is defined in the Act as “corrupt practice means any of the practices specified in section 123” What does corrupt practices mean. Section 123 in The Representation of the People Act, 1951 provides for the same. Corrupt practices.— The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act:— (1)“Bribery”, that is to say— (A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate […]
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WHAT HAPPENS WHEN MAKER OF THE WILL DIRECTS TO PAY THE EXECUTOR FROM A PARTICULAR FUND? CAN COURT ISSUE A PROBATE?
To understand the case query we must first learn the provisions of the Indian Succession Act of 1925 IS AN EXECUTOR A TRUSTEE? “There is a distinction between a trustee and an executor, in that the former has only the power to pay what is vested in him as trustee to the persons for whose use he holds it, but has no general power to receive and pay what is due to and from the estate, which is the office of the latter (vide paragraph 13, p. 12 of Williams). The same proposition appears in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd Edn., Vol. 16, p. 124, in paragraph 180)” Provisions of Indian Succession Act 1925 Sec 222: Probate only to appoint an executor. (1) Probate shall be granted only to an executor appointed by the will. (2) The appointment may be expressed or by necessary implication. Illustrations (i) A wills that C be his executor if B will not. B is appointed executor by implication. (ii) A gives a legacy to B and several legacies to other persons, among the rest to his daughter-in-law C, and adds “but should the within-named C be not living I do constitute and appoint B my whole and sole executrix”. C is appointed executrix by implication. (iii) A appoints several persons executors of his will and codicils and his nephew residuary legatee, and in another codicil are these words,– “I appoint my nephew my residuary legatee to discharge all lawful demands against my will and codicils signed of different dates”. The nephew is appointed an executor by implication. Grant of administration of universal or residuary legatees.— When—(a)the deceased has made a Will, but has not appointed an executor, or (b)the deceased has appointed an executor who is legally incapable or refuses to act, or who has died before the testator or before he has proved the Will, or (c)the executor dies after having proved the will, but before he has administered all the estate of the deceased, a universal or a residuary legatee may be admitted proving the Will and letters of administration with the Will annexed may be granted to him of the whole estate, or of so much thereof as may be unadministered. Narration: Thus, the test for finding out whether a person is an executor according to the tenor is to find out whether he is, by necessary implication, nominated by the testator in his stead to generally administer the estate and to pay the testator’s debts and to receive his dues in the performance of his will. An executor is placed in the stead of the testator and he has the right of action against the testator’s debtors and has also the right to dispose of the goods of the testator towards the payment of his debts and the performance of his will. An executor need not be expressly nominated; and if by necessary implication the testator recommends or commits to one or more the charge and office, or the rights which appertain to an executor, it amounts to as much as the ordaining or constituting him or them to be […]
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CAN A COURT STOP A PARTY FROM SPEAKING? LESSONS FROM LILAVATI TRUST v. HDFC BANK
INTRODUCTION The Bombay High Court recently dealt with an important issue arising in a high-profile dispute between the Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust and HDFC Bank. The Trust instituted a defamation suit against HDFC Bank and its officials and sought interim relief restraining the defendants from making further statements allegedly affecting the reputation of the Trust and its trustees. The Court declined to grant the interim injunction. Although the final rights of the parties will be decided at trial, the order raises an important question: Can a person obtain a court order preventing another person from speaking merely because the statements are alleged to be defamatory? The answer, according to long-settled principles of Indian law, is generally no. WHY IS THIS CASE IMPORTANT? Many litigants believe that once a defamation suit is filed, the Court will immediately restrain the opposite party from making further statements. However, Indian courts have consistently adopted a cautious approach while granting injunctions in defamation matters. An injunction restricting speech is considered a serious remedy because it directly affects the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Consequently, courts insist upon a very high threshold before issuing what is effectively a “gag order”. THE REAL ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT The dispute before the Court was not whether the statements were ultimately true or false. The issue was much narrower: Here are the Prayers sought: the prayers in the Suit that forms the basis of IA 3095 are extracted below: i. A Decree may be passed for Permanent Perpetual Injunction in favour of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants thereby restraining the Defendants, their representatives, employees, agents, heirs, or any other person from vilifying ,maligning, tarnishing, levelling scathing allegations and casting aspersions upon the reputation, good will and image of the Plaintiffs and family through any medium whatsoever; ii. The Defendants and their representatives may be permanently restrained from circulating/publishing/ uploading any defamatory content harming/injuring or damaging the reputation of the Plaintiffs on any social media intermediaries; iii. Pending the hearing and final disposal of the present Suit, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to restrain the Defendants, their representatives, employees, agents, heirs, or any other person from vilifying, maligning, tarnishing, levelling scathing allegations and casting aspersions upon the reputation, good will and image of the Plaintiffs and family through any medium whatsoever; iv. That pending the hearing and final disposal of the present Suit, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct the Defendants and media channels including the X Corp/Defendant No. 5 (X. Com, formerly known as Twitter) and Meta Platforms Inc. (FaceBook)/ Defendant No. 6 to remove all defamatory and libelous articles/materials from all accounts, which has been published in any form against the Plaintiff and Mr. Prashant Mehta and his family; v. That pending the hearing and final disposal of the present Suit, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct the Defendant No.1 i.e., the HDFC Bank to remove the Media Statement and the Press Release from the website of theDefendant No. 1 Bank (which are accessible at)i.e.,https://www.hdfcbank.com/personal/about-us/news-room/press-release/2025/q2/media-statement and https://www.hdfcbank.com/ vi. That this Hon’ble Court […]
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H-1B VISA CASE AN ANALYSIS
EXECUTIVE TAXATION AND THE LIMITS OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA ET AL. V. MULLIN ET AL. Introduction In State of California et al. v. Mullin et al., U.S. District Judge Leo T. Sorokin invalidated a federal policy requiring employers to pay an additional $100,000 when filing certain H-1B visa petitions. The decision raises important questions regarding the constitutional allocation of taxing authority, the scope of executive power under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Court’s Constitutional Analysis At the center of the dispute was whether the $100,000 payment constituted a permissible regulatory fee or an unauthorized tax. Judge Sorokin concluded that the surcharge functioned as a tax because it was not reasonably related to the government’s costs of processing or administering H-1B petitions. Instead, the payment was designed to influence employer behavior and generate revenue. The court emphasized the Constitution’s allocation of taxing power to Congress. Because Congress had not expressly authorized the executive branch to impose such a charge, the policy violated fundamental separation-of-powers principles. The ruling reinforces the proposition that the executive cannot create new fiscal obligations absent clear legislative authorization. Statutory Authority Under the INA The government argued that Sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA provided sufficient authority for the surcharge. These provisions grant the President broad discretion to restrict the entry of non-citizens when deemed detrimental to U.S. interests. The court rejected this interpretation, holding that while the provisions authorize restrictions on entry, they do not authorize the imposition of substantial monetary obligations on domestic employers. The decision reflects judicial reluctance to infer expansive fiscal powers from broadly worded immigration statutes. Administrative Procedure Act Concerns The court further held that the policy violated the APA because it was implemented without notice-and-comment rule-making. The administration relied on guidance documents, memoranda, and related agency materials to establish the surcharge. Judge Sorokin determined that these actions effectively created binding legal obligations and therefore constituted legislative rule-making subject to APA procedural requirements. Additionally, the court found the policy arbitrary and capricious. The government failed to provide a reasoned explanation for selecting the $100,000 amount and did not adequately evaluate the consequences for employers, universities, hospitals, and research institutions. Conclusion The decision serves as a significant reaffirmation of constitutional limits on executive authority. By characterizing the surcharge as a tax rather than a fee, the court underscored Congress’s exclusive role in taxation and signaled that broad immigration powers cannot be used to circumvent legislative control over fiscal policy. Authors view : While the Trump administration did not formally single out Indians in its immigration policies, changes to the H-1B visa program had a disproportionate impact on Indian nationals, who make up the majority of H-1B recipients. Increased fees, tighter scrutiny, and stricter eligibility standards were presented as measures to safeguard American jobs and reduce dependence on foreign labour. Critics contended that these policies created significant challenges for skilled Indian professionals and the technology firms that rely on them. VIEWS OF PRESIDENT OF USA Link to entire case with complaint, motion and Judgment https://www.doj.state.or.us/oregon-department-of-justice/federal-oversight/federal-litigation-tracker/h-1b-visa-petition-fees-california-v-noem-d-mass/?utm_source=chatgpt.com […]
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ASSIGNMENT OF LEASEHOLD RIGHTS UNDER GST: ANALYSIS OF LUNA CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. V. UNION OF INDIA (GUJARAT HIGH COURT)
Introduction The Gujarat High Court’s decision in Luna Chemical Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India has added another significant chapter to the ongoing debate concerning the GST implications of transfers of leasehold rights in industrial plots. The judgment reaffirms the principle that a transfer of leasehold rights by an existing lessee is fundamentally different from the original grant of lease by a statutory authority and cannot automatically be subjected to GST as a supply of service. The ruling is particularly relevant for industries operating in Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC) estates and for taxpayers involved in the transfer of long-term leasehold interests in industrial land. Background of the Dispute Luna Chemical Industries Pvt. Ltd. held leasehold rights in an industrial plot allotted through the GIDC framework. Subsequently, the company assigned its leasehold rights to another entity after obtaining the requisite approvals from GIDC. The GST authorities initiated proceedings under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, alleging that the assignment of leasehold rights constituted a taxable supply of services and consequently raised a demand for GST. The petitioner challenged the demand before the Gujarat High Court. CORE LEGAL ISSUE The principal question before the Court was: Whether the assignment of leasehold rights in an industrial plot by a lessee to a third party constitutes a taxable supply of services under the GST regime. The answer depended upon the characterization of the transaction. If the transaction represented a supply of service, GST would be leviable. Conversely, if it constituted a transfer of an interest in immovable property, it would fall outside the scope of taxable supplies. RATIO DECIDENDI The Court held that the transfer of leasehold rights by an existing lessee is legally distinct from the original lease granted by GIDC. The ratio of the decision may be summarized as follows: The assignment of long-term leasehold rights by a lessee results in the transfer of an existing interest in immovable property and does not amount to a taxable supply of services merely because the original allotment was made through a lease arrangement. Consequently, GST cannot be imposed on such assignment solely by treating it as a continuation of the original leasing transaction. Distinction between Lease and Assignment A key aspect of the judgment is the Court’s recognition of the legal distinction between: Original Lease by GIDC GIDC grants the right to use and enjoy immovable property while retaining ownership. Such a transaction may be characterized as a supply of service under GST. Subsequent Assignment by the Lessee The lessee transfers its existing leasehold interest to another person. The assignor divests itself of the rights held in the property. The transaction involves transfer of an interest in immovable property rather than provision of a service. The Court emphasized that these are two separate legal transactions and cannot be treated identically for GST purposes. Reliance on Earlier Precedent The judgment follows the Gujarat High Court’s earlier ruling in Gujarat Chamber of Commerce & Industry v. Union of India, where the Court had examined the GST treatment of leasehold interests in industrial plots. By relying on the principles laid […]
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Electoral Rolls and the Foundations of Democracy: Reflections on the Supreme Court’s 2025 Judgment
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: The Supreme Court of India’s 2025 judgment in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India begins not with procedural technicalities, but with a profound constitutional question: who constitutes the political community of a democracy? Before a state can count votes, the Court observes, it must first determine whose votes are entitled to be counted. In this framing, the electoral roll emerges not as a routine administrative document, but as the legal foundation of representative government itself. Chief Justice Surya Kant, writing for the Court, situates the controversy within a long historical and philosophical tradition. The judgment emphasizes that disputes concerning electoral rolls are inseparable from the legitimacy of democratic governance. Every democracy must define the body of citizens who may participate in collective political decision-making. Electoral registration, therefore, becomes an issue of constitutional identity rather than mere bureaucracy. What makes the introduction especially striking is its historical sweep. The Court traces India’s democratic inheritance back to the ancient republics of the Gangetic plains, particularly the Vajji confederacy centered around Vaishali in present-day Bihar. During the Mahajanapada period, approximately the sixth and fifth centuries BCE, the region witnessed both monarchies and non-monarchical political systems. While Magadha and Anga represented kingship, the Vajji polity embodied forms of collective governance and assembly-based decision-making. Drawing upon the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, the judgment describes the Vajjis as conducting frequent assemblies, deliberating in concord, and operating according to established institutions. Although these republics did not practice universal adult suffrage in the modern constitutional sense, they nonetheless required mechanisms to determine who could participate in governance. Participation was often restricted by lineage, rank, or status, yet the central political problem remained familiar: defining membership within the governing community. ( CURTSY wikipidea) ( The Mahāparinibbāna Sutta is Sutta 16 in the Dīgha Nikāya, a scripture belonging to the Sutta Piṭaka of Theravāda Buddhism. It concerns the end of Gautama Buddha’s life – his parinibbāna – and is the longest sutta of the Pāli Canon. Because of its attention to detail, it has been resorted to as the principal source of reference in most standard accounts of the Buddha’s death) This historical exploration serves an important constitutional purpose. By invoking ancient republican traditions, the Court underscores that the question of political inclusion has deep roots in Indian civilization. The legitimacy of governance has long depended upon recognized procedures for identifying participants in public affairs. Modern electoral rolls are therefore part of a much older democratic continuum, though transformed by constitutional principles of equality and universal suffrage. The judgment’s introductory reasoning also reflects a broader philosophy of constitutional democracy. Representative government does not begin at the polling booth; it begins with inclusion in the electoral process itself. Errors, exclusions, or manipulations in electoral rolls can alter the composition of the electorate and thereby affect democratic legitimacy. In this sense, voter registration is not peripheral to democracy—it is constitutive of it. By grounding its analysis in history, political theory, and constitutional values, the Supreme Court elevates the debate over electoral rolls beyond procedural administration. The judgment reminds us that democracy depends not only on free elections, but also […]
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AUTHORS’ RIGHTS AGAINST PUBLISHERS IN INDIA: NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY, ROYALTY PROTECTION AND LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY
AUTHORS’ RIGHTS AGAINST PUBLISHERS IN INDIA: NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY, ROYALTY PROTECTION AND LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY BY SHRUTI DESAI Abstract The Indian publishing industry has witnessed growing concerns regarding non-payment of royalties, suppression of sales figures, denial of accounts, unauthorized reprints, and exploitative copyright assignments. Many authors, particularly academic and regional-language writers, suffer financial loss because publishers often maintain opaque accounting systems and one-sided publishing agreements. This article examines the legal rights of authors under the Copyright Act, 1957, discusses the right to royalties and rendition of accounts, and analyses important judicial precedents protecting authors against unfair publishing practices. The article also highlights the urgent need for statutory reforms ensuring transparency, accountability, and equitable sharing of publishing revenues. Keywords #Copyright, #royalty, #publishing #agreements, #rendition of #accounts, $authors’rights, #copyright #assignment, #literary works, #publishing industry, #moralrights, #transparency. INTRODUCTION The relationship between an author and a publisher is traditionally founded on trust, transparency, and mutual commercial benefit. However, in India, numerous authors — particularly academic writers, regional-language writers, educational authors, and first-time authors — have repeatedly complained of unfair publishing practices. These include non-payment or delayed payment of royalties, refusal to furnish proper sales statements, under-reporting of print runs, unauthorised reprints, misuse of digital rights, and one-sided copyright assignments. Many authors are compelled to sign standard-form publishing agreements without bargaining power. In several instances, publishers continue commercially exploit literary works while withholding accurate accounts of sales. Such practices not only amount to breach of contract but may also constitute infringement of statutory and moral rights under the Copyright Act, 1957. Indian courts have recognised that authors possess enforceable rights against publishers and licensees, including the right to rendition of accounts and protection against unauthorised exploitation of copyright. Legal Framework Under Indian Copyright Law The principal legislation governing literary rights in India is the Copyright Act, 1957. The Act recognises copyright as a valuable proprietary right and protects authors against unauthorised use of their works. Ownership of Copyright Section 17 of the Copyright Act recognises the author as the first owner of copyright, subject to limited exceptions. Assignment of Copyright Sections 18 and 19 regulate the assignment of copyright. An assignment must: • be in writing; • identify the specific rights assigned; • specify duration and territorial extent; • mention royalty and consideration. Where the duration is not specified, the assignment is deemed to be for five years. If the territorial extent is not specified, it is presumed to extend only within India. The 2012 amendments to the Copyright Act significantly strengthened author protection, especially concerning royalty rights. Royalty Rights of Authors The concept of royalty is central to publishing contracts. Royalty constitutes the author’s share in commercial exploitation of the literary work. Unfortunately, many publishers fail to disclose: • actual print quantities; • reprints; • warehouse stock; • digital sales; • export sales; • online platform sales; • discount structures; • destruction of unsold stock. This results in substantial financial loss to authors. The law increasingly recognizes that authors cannot be deprived of equitable royalty participation. In a significant development, the Calcutta High Court observed that the Copyright Act now recognizes the right of equal […]
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AUTHORS, PUBLISHERS, AND DATA RETENTION: A LEGAL STUDY UNDER INDIA’S DIGITAL PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION ACT
AUTHORS, PUBLISHERS, AND DATA RETENTION: A LEGAL STUDY UNDER INDIA’S DIGITAL PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION ACT Introduction In today’s digital world, personal data has become one of the most valuable and also vulnerable assets for businesses, governments, and online platforms. Every interaction conducted through digital systems generates information that can identify individuals, including names, addresses, financial records, identity documents, and communication details. As India’s digital economy continues to expand rapidly, concerns relating to privacy, misuse of information, unauthorized access, and data security have become increasingly important. To address these concerns, India enacted the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act). The legislation establishes a legal framework governing the collection, storage, use, processing, and deletion of personal data. Its objective is to protect the privacy rights of individuals while also enabling lawful and responsible data processing for business and governance purposes. The law has particular significance for professionals working in creative industries, especially authors and writers, who routinely share personal information, unpublished manuscripts, research materials, and confidential communications with publishers and digital platforms. What Is Personal Data? Personal data refers to any information that can identify an individual either directly or indirectly. Under the DPDP Act, this includes information such as: Names Mobile numbers Email addresses Aadhaar details Financial and banking information Location data Identity documents The Act applies primarily to digital personal data processed within India. It may also apply to organizations located outside India if they offer goods or services to individuals in India. As digital communication and cloud storage become central to business operations, the protection of personal information has become a critical legal and ethical responsibility. Key Principles of India’s Data Protection Law The DPDP Act is built upon several foundational principles intended to ensure responsible data governance. Consent-Based Processing Organizations must obtain clear and informed consent before collecting or processing personal data. Consent should be free, specific, informed, and capable of being withdrawn easily by the individual. This principle ensures that individuals retain meaningful control over how their personal information is used. Purpose Limitation Personal data may only be used for the purpose for which it was originally collected. Organizations cannot repurpose data for unrelated activities without obtaining fresh authorization. For example, if a publisher collects an author’s banking information for royalty payments, that information cannot later be used for unrelated marketing activities without consent. Data Minimization The law discourages excessive collection of information. Organizations should collect only the data necessary for a legitimate purpose. Data Security Entities handling personal information are required to implement reasonable safeguards to prevent unauthorized access, data breaches, leaks, or misuse. Data Erasure Personal data must be deleted once the purpose for which it was collected has been fulfilled or when consent has been withdrawn, unless another law requires its retention. Rights of Individuals Under the DPDP Act The DPDP Act grants several important rights to individuals, often referred to as “Data Principals.” These rights include: The right to access information regarding their personal data The right to correct inaccurate or outdated information The right to request erasure of personal data The right to grievance redressal The right to nominate another […]
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The Silent Crisis in Legal Practice: When Clients Succeed but Lawyers Remain Unpaid
The Silent Crisis in Legal Practice: When Clients Succeed but Lawyers Remain Unpaid For many advocates, the deepest professional frustration is not losing a case. It is succeeding for a client and still remaining unpaid. Across years of practice, many lawyers experience the same pattern repeatedly: urgent consultations, endless conferences, strategic drafting, court appearances, emotional pressure, favorable outcomes, and then delayed, reduced, or completely denied professional fees. This problem becomes more painful in matters involving “success-linked” fee understandings. During the crisis stage, clients make assurances freely. Once relief is obtained — settlement, injunction, bail, recovery, business advantage, or litigation success — the financial commitment often becomes negotiable in the client’s mind. The result is not only financial loss. It creates professional exhaustion and distrust within practice. The Real Issue Is Structural In many cases, the problem is not merely dishonesty by individual clients. It is the absence of professional billing structure. Traditional relationship-based practice often relies on: verbal fee discussions, informal understandings, post-result payments, unlimited access to the lawyer, and emotional trust instead of documented systems. Such models place disproportionate risk on the advocate. The lawyer invests: time, intellectual effort, strategy, office resources, staff coordination, and professional reputation, while payment remains uncertain until the very end. Why This Pattern Damages Legal Practice Over time, repeated unpaid work creates: burnout, resentment toward clients, unstable cash flow, inability to scale chambers, reduced professional boundaries, and loss of motivation despite competence. Many capable lawyers become financially strained not because they lack legal skill, but because they lack enforceable economic structure within practice management. The Need for Professional Financial Discipline Modern legal practice requires systems, not assumptions. Advocates increasingly need: * written engagement terms, * stage-wise billing, * advance retainers, * consultation fees, * documented payment schedules, * and clear pause rights for non-payment. Equally important is client selection. Clients who: * resist written fee clarity, * negotiate excessively, * avoid advances, * or continuously postpone payment discussions often become future collection problems. Success Fees Should Not Be Survival Fees A major mistake in practice economics is depending on future “success fees” as the primary compensation. A healthier structure is: * proper professional fees during the matter, * with any success-linked component treated only as additional upside. This protects the advocate from total economic loss even if the client later defaults. Professionalism Must Continue Even During Recovery Non-payment should never push advocates toward public confrontation, emotional communication, or unethical pressure tactics. Fee recovery efforts should remain: * Documented, * Dignified, * Neutral, * And professionally managed. Long-term reputation is more valuable than short-term anger. A major lacuna in the existing legal framework is the absence of a statutory mechanism securing payment of professional fees to advocates. While the Advocates Act, 1961 emphasizes professional ethics and duties toward clients, it does not adequately protect advocates from non-payment of legitimate fees after rendering legal services. Need for an Advocates’ Security of Fees Act The present legal framework under the Advocates Act, 1961 does not provide an effective statutory mechanism for securing payment of professional fees to advocates. Although advocates are ethically prohibited from abandoning clients unfairly […]
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International Law and the Vulnerabilities of the Global Market
The foundational promise of postwar international economic law was straightforward: establish a rules-based order, and predictable markets would generate shared global prosperity. For decades, multilateral institutions—anchored by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and an expansive network of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)—functioned as stabilizing mechanisms for global capital and cross-border trade. Yet the contemporary world economy is increasingly defined not by seamless integration, but by structural fragmentation, geopolitical rivalry, volatile supply chains, and re-surging economic nationalism. As global markets become more vulnerable to political shocks and strategic competition, international legal frameworks are struggling to adapt. Rather than operating as neutral arbiters of trade and investment, these institutions are increasingly transformed into arenas of geopolitical contestation. Geopolitical Power and the Global Economy The global economy is often portrayed as a system governed primarily by trade law, market liberalization, and international cooperation. In practice, however, power politics continues to shape economic outcomes far more profoundly than legal idealism frequently acknowledges. Economic sanctions, military interventions, control over strategic resources, and dominance over global financial infrastructure have become central instruments of international influence. One of the clearest examples is the structural dominance of the United States within the dollar-based global financial system. Since a significant portion of international trade, energy transactions, and sovereign reserves are denominated in U.S. dollars, Washington possesses extraordinary leverage over the global economy. States perceived as challenging American strategic interests can face sanctions, restrictions on banking access, limitations on dollar settlements, and exclusion from critical financial networks. This financial centrality extends American influence far beyond conventional territorial boundaries. India itself experienced the coercive dimension of economic policy following the 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests, when the United States imposed sanctions under its non-proliferation framework. Although India ultimately absorbed these pressures and later developed stronger strategic relations with the United States, the episode illustrated how economic instruments can be mobilized to discipline sovereign states. Similarly, Iran has endured decades of comprehensive sanctions affecting its banking sector, oil exports, trade networks, and broader economic stability. The Iranian case demonstrates how sanctions can evolve from temporary diplomatic measures into long-term geopolitical instruments aimed at strategic containment. Energy politics further intensifies these tensions. Oil-rich regions frequently become focal points of international intervention, proxy conflicts, and political destabilization. Critics argue that major powers often seek to influence resource-rich states either directly through military intervention or indirectly through regime pressure, economic dependency, and geopolitical alignment. At the same time, recent developments indicate that American financial dominance is no longer entirely uncontested. China, Russia, India, and several BRICS members have increasingly explored alternatives to dollar-centric trade mechanisms through local currency settlements, regional payment systems, and efforts toward financial multipolarity. Although the dollar remains dominant, these developments reflect growing dissatisfaction with the concentration of monetary power within a single state. The Iranian experience also reveals the limitations of conventional coercive power. Despite decades of sanctions and diplomatic isolation, Iran has retained significant regional influence and strategic resilience. This underscores the broader reality that modern geopolitical conflicts cannot be resolved solely through economic pressure or military superiority. Consequently, the modern global economy cannot be understood exclusively […]
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Committees Are Not Courts: Bombay High Court Draws the Line
STOP PLAYING JUDGE: HOUSING SOCIETIES CANNOT DECIDE TITLE An interesting case came up before the Bombay High Court, where aforesaid issue was argued and decided. Facts of the case are as under: The dispute concerns ownership of Flat No. 31 in a Malad housing society in Mumbai. The flat was purchased around 1969–70 by Ramlal Dhanuka using his own funds but was registered jointly in his name and Pannadevi (wife of his son D. R. Dhanuka). Ramlal had three sons—D. R. Dhanuka, K. R. Dhanuka, and Radheshyam Dhanuka (Respondent No. 4)—who later occupied different flats bought by him. After Ramlal and his wife died in 1989, the sons became legal heirs. In 2007, Pannadevi filed a suit claiming exclusive ownership of the disputed flat and denying any rights of Radheshyam. She died in 2008, and her legal heirs continued the case. Meanwhile, an order was passed restraining the housing society from transferring or dealing with the flat’s membership rights until the suit is decided. Core issue: Whether the flat belongs exclusively to Pannadevi or forms part of the family property. Now let us see the arguments of the Petitioner: the Society argued that Respondent No. 4 wrongly applied for transfer of membership instead of transmission after the member’s death and failed to follow mandatory procedures under Bye-Law 35, including public notice and verification of legal heirs, while also submitting an incomplete application. It also argued that there are disputes among heirs; society further contended that the Divisional Joint Registrar lacked jurisdiction to hear a revision against the Deputy Registrar’s order, but the Court rejected this, holding that cooperative societies only perform limited administrative roles (not deciding ownership, as noted in Usha Jhaveri vs State of Maharashtra) and that revisional authority remains valid despite delegation of powers, thereby upholding the legality of such review. Respondent member argued that: After the earlier suit concerning the flat was unconditionally withdrawn in 2012, clearing disputes over title, Respondent No. 4 applied for membership as a legal heir, but the society failed to decide his application, leading him to seek deemed membership and later file a revision; he argued that the society had effectively recognized him by accepting maintenance charges and that minor defects in the application form should not defeat his substantive claim of succession, while also relying on lack of opposition from key family members, whereas the petitioners contended that multiple heirs existed and the application was invalid due to incorrect form and procedure; the Court, however, emphasized that substance prevails over form, held that the application was essentially for transmission based on inheritance despite technical errors, found that the alleged disputes among heirs were not strong enough to justify inaction, and rejected the jurisdictional objection, thereby supporting the validity of the revisional proceedings and Respondent No. 4’s claim being considered. It was held by the Bombay High Court that: the dispute before the society was not about ownership/title, but merely about recognition of membership after the death of a member, making it an issue of internal administration rather than adjudication of property rights. It emphasized that Section 30 of the Maharashtra Cooperative […]
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“Can Sons Restrain a Mother from Transferring Property? A Legal Analysis under Hindu Law”
CAN SONS FILE SUIT AGAINST MOTHER (HINDU) FOR STAY AGAINST TRANSFER OF SHARES / PROPERTY HELD BY MOTHER IN A FAMILY PROPERTY/ PRIVATE COMPANY ABSOLUTELY TO DAUGHTER? Hindu law prohibits dowry. But dowry is given in one form or another. Hindu Law after 2004 amendment gave equal right to married daughter in father’s property. View of Author Equal property rights for married daughters are an important step toward fairness and gender equality. However, in some families this can also create tensions in relationships. After marriage, daughters may be influenced by their husband or in-laws, and when disputes over property arise, disagreements can escalate into legal battles or serious family conflicts. While the intention behind laws like the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 is to ensure justice and equal rights, the practical implementation sometimes leads to strained family ties when expectations about property are unclear or contested. In such situations, disagreements over inheritance may even end up in court or cause long-lasting rifts within families. Therefore, along with legal equality, maintaining open communication, clear property planning, and mutual understanding within families is important to prevent conflicts and preserve relationships. Law makers must prevent this situation resulting into strained relationships. Broken relations makes society psychologically weaker. Continue… with article… Let us see Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.―(1)Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.―In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. If the shares are the mother’s self-acquired property (bought by her or gifted to her), she has absolute authority to transfer them to anyone she wishes, and the sons have no legal standing to stop her during her lifetime. Section 5 of the said Act provides for exception: Act not to apply to certain properties. ―This Act shall not apply to― (i) any property succession to which is regulated by the Indian Succession Act, 1925 ( 39 of 1925), by reason of the provisions contained in section 21 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (43 of 1954); (ii) any estate which descends to a single heir by the terms of any covenant or agreement entered […]
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